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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
Analytic game theory is the mathematics of strategy,
and as such, holds great promise for helping to
understand conflicts. At the same time, analytic game
theory has a weak record of explaining and/or
predicting real world conflict – about the same as
random chance according to Armstrong (2002), Green
(2002). In the field of economics, Camerer (1999)
points out that the explanatory and predictive powers
of analytic game theory are being improved by
replacing prescriptions from rational economics with
descriptions from the psychology of monetary
judgment and decision making. This has resulted in
‘behavioral game theory’ which adds in emotions,
heuristics, and so on. In this paper, we pursue the same
approach and believe the term ‘behavioral game
theory’ is broad enough to cover all areas of social
science, not just economics.
Specifically, the military, diplomatic, and intelligence
analysis community would like for (behavioral) game
theory to satisfy an expanding range of scenario
simulation concerns. Their interest goes beyond
mission-oriented military behaviors, to also include
simulations of the effects that an array of alternative
diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic
(DIME) actions might have upon the political, military,
economic, social, informational (psyops), and
infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions of a foreign
region. The goal is to understand factional tensions and
issues, how to prevent and end conflicts, and to
examine alternative ways to influence and possibly
shape outcomes for the collective good.
PROFILING FACTIONS AND THE
FACTIONSIM TESTBED
Our exploration begins by constructing a testbed
(FactionSim) that facilitates the codification of
alternative theories of factional interaction and the
evaluation of policy alternatives. FactionSim is a tool
where you set up a conflict scenario in which the
factional leader and follower agents all run
autonomously. You are the sole human interacting and
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using a set of DIME actions to influence outcomes and
PMESII effects (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 –Models and Components that
must be synthesized for a FactionSim Testbed

Factions are modeled as in the center of Figure 1 where
each has a leader, two sub-faction leaders (loyal and
fringe), a set of starting resources (Economy, E,
Security, S, and Politics, P), and a representative set of
over 1,000 follower agents. A leader is assumed to
manage his faction’s E- and S- tanks so as to appeal to
his followers and to each of the other tribes or factions
he wants in his alliance. Each of the leaders of those
factions, however, will similarly manage their own E
and S assets in trying to keep their sub-factions and
memberships happy. Followers determine the level of
the P-tank by voting their membership level (see Sect.
3.2). A high P-tank means that there are more members
to recruit for security missions and/or to train and
deploy in economic ventures. So leaders often find it
difficult to move to alignments and positions that are
very far from the motivations of their memberships.
Despite efforts at simplicity, stochastic simulation
models for domains such as this rapidly become
complex. The strategy space for each leader facing
only two other leaders is in the trillions of options, a
number impossibly large to explore. As a result,
FactionSim’s Experiment Dashboard (left side of
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Fig.1) permits inputs ranging from one course of action
to a set of parameter experiments the player is curious
about. On the bottom left is the profile editor of the
personalities for the leaders and sub-leaders, and of the
key parameters that define the starting conditions of
each of the factions and sub-factions. Certain actions
by the player that are thought to alter the starting
attitudes or behavior of the factions can flow between
these two components – e.g., a discussion beforehand
that might alter the attitudes of certain key leaders
(Note: this action is often attempted in settings with
real SMEs and diplomats playing our games).
Game Analysis
FactionSim runs a set of multiple games, G = {G1, G2,
…, Gn} simultaneously. Within a faction one may
observe games between rival leaders, between leaders
and followers, and follower on follower. The acrossfaction games include attempts to cooperate and/or
compete with other factions’ leaders and followers,
and/or attempts to contain factions aimed at your own
downfall. For discussion’s sake, consider these as
iterated semi-cooperative games (ISCGs). This game
formulation is the simplest game one can analyze
involving conflicts between (and within) factions.
Using it helps to clarify many of the key elements of
these conflicts.
Let us next consider how FactionSim’s games might be
treated by two types of ISCG agents, namely:
Rational Actors: Presumed normative and devoid of
psychic concepts as in post-WW II economic theory
and intro game theory classes - perfectly informed,
purely logical, constant discount rate (i), and motivated
by self-interest to maximize their material payoffs. All
actors have identical payoff functions where they
compute R{E|S|P}as uncontested resources, Q as
resources at stake, and CstA as the cost of actions. The
expected payoff is thus: Payoff = R + Q – CstA.
Mutual conflict or fight-fight is a well-known Nash
equilibrium. We know also that if CxCy> FxCy, then
mutual cooperation is Pareto optimal and in repeated
games, if the agent histories are remembered, no agent
is excessively powerful, and agents start with mutual
cooperation, then the following is the well-known
mixed strategy that will prevail: attack if provoked (titfor-tat) to deter other leaders from taking advantage,
but otherwise cooperate. The subgame perfect
equilibrium consists of long periods of cooperation
punctuated by occasional conflicts. Ignoring rare
conflicts, one may write the predicted payoffs for any
given ‘rational’ agent in alliance with others as:
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PAYOFFx =

∑

T
t =0

CxCy (t ) /(1 + i )t

(1)

Descriptive agents: Swedberg (2001, p.325) states "If
sociological game theory is not to end up as an
artificial exercise, it is absolutely essential that the
beliefs, ideas and experiences of the actors themselves
are moved onto center stage". One must profile the
individuals involved to find out the inventory of items
at stake and to build realistic agent models. We do this
with best-of-breed social science instruments (Sect 3).
Such actors use these approaches to decide everything
from R and Q, to the size of an action, to how to
discount (i), to how much they are willing to pay for
their gambits (CstA), etc. – one wouldn’t even expect
to use the same formulas for normative vs. descriptive
computations. Aside from material payoffs, these
agents attend to moralistic issues driven by their
emotional value (emV) and how relationships (ΔKxy)
change; they may commit errors and use biased
heuristics; and they may see games through a different
lens (e.g., settling grievances, fast track to next life).
For these agents, the payoff function becomes Payoff =
R + Q – CstA - | ΔK | + emV.
Researchers like Macy & Flache (2004) show that as
one alters agent aspirations (something equivalent to
emV and ΔK), the stable equilibrium [1] collapses and
the prediction of fight-fight becomes near-continual.
Woods (2004) shows that divisibility of Q as well as
emV and ΔK type issues must be elaborated if conflicts
are to be settled. Results like this mean that one must
reduce the guess work about what drives the resource
disputes, moral dilemmas, and social relationship
grievances.
PERSONALITY PROFILING MODELS
Profiling of personalities has not yet reached the stage
of a mature science with first principles; however, there
are best-of-breed profiling instruments with respectable
field trials and high inter-rater reliability. These are
useful for creating agent frameworks with greater
degrees of realism. Such implementations, if done
carefully, may in fact improve profiling science.
Hendrickson and McKelvey (2002) suggest that social
science theories, in general, need to be computationally
formalized as agent models to show they are
analytically adequate. These models in turn must be
subjected to correspondence tests against real world
phenomena to verify them (ontologic adequacy). This
two step testing process improves the science by
revealing the agenda for advancement.
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Unlike the evolutionary tradition where personas are
mutated, this approach of profiling real personalities
within connectionist agent models allows one to watch
the generative mechanism and to observe what they do,
how they learn and adapt, and what macro-behavior
emerges from the actors’ micro-decisions. Using
profiling instruments reduces the dimensionality to the
traits and factors they require, and where these are
applied, we can use training datasets, fill in the traits
and factors of archetypical as well as real characters,
conduct validation tests, and treat these parameters as
no longer independent variables clouding the larger
political analyses – they exist within encapsulated
components and only their inter-relationships to other
parts are significant when assessing the whole. This is
no different than systems engineering for any
complicated device. A crash test of an automobile does
not depend on how the pistons fire. We similarly
encapsulate other parts of the faction model – e.g., the
(E|S|P) resource tanks that we currently model as
stacks of poker chips that grow or fall. One can plug in
finer resolution models for any given tank without
affecting overall system performance. With that in
mind, we turn now to the best-of-breed profiling
theories we implemented as leader and follower
models.
Profiling Leaders
In FactionSim, each leader and follower is modeled
within a framework known as PMFserv (Silverman
2005) where the leader’s cultural values and
personality traits are represented through Goal,
Standards and Preference (GSP) trees. These are multiattribute value structures where each tree node is
weighted with Bayesian probabilities or importance
weights. A Preference Tree is one’s long term desires
for world situations and relations (e.g., no weapons of
mass destruction, stop global warming, etc.) that may
or may not be achieved in the scope of a scenario. In
FactionSim agents this translates into a weighted
hierarchy of territories and constituencies (e.g., no
tokens of leader X in resource Y of territory Z). The
Standards Tree defines the methods a leader is willing
to take to attain his/her preferences, and what code that
others should live by as well. Finally, the Goal Tree
holds short term needs the agent seeks to satisfy each
turn (e.g., vulnerability avoidance, power, rest, etc.).
The GSP tree is a value model editor that allows one to
(a) implement leader and follower profile instruments
as nodes on the trees and (b) set the weights on the
nodes which in turn implements a personality profile
(see Figure 2).
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Figure 2 – GSP Tree Structure, Weights,
and Activations
Perhaps the best leader profiling instrument is
Hermann (1999) who offers a descriptive theory of
leader style that is measurable and can be fully
implemented in this framework. After two decades of
studying over 122 national leaders including
presidents, prime minister, kings, and dictators,
Hermann uncovered a set of leadership styles that
appear to influence how leaders interact with
constituents, advisers, or other leaders. Hermann
determined that seven traits are particularly useful in
assessing leadership style: need for power, control,
openness (combines 2 traits), task vs. relationship
focus, distrust, and in-group bias.
In Hermann’s profiling method, each trait is assessed
through content analysis of leaders’ interview
responses as well as or other secondary sources of
information. Hermann’s research also has developed
methods to assess leadership at a distance, based
mostly on the public statements of leaders. Hermann
(1999) has developed mean scores on each of the seven
traits. A leader is considered to have high score on a
trait, if he or she is one standard deviation above the
average score for all leaders on that trait.
In order to implement the Hermann instrument as an
agent model (GSP Trees), we had to do the following:
• Need to increase power (and its inverse,
protection) is both a long term Preference as well as a
short term Goal. So it appears on both trees. In the
Machiavellian and Hermann-profiled world of leaders,
the goal tree reduces to a duality of growing vs.
protecting the resources in one’s constituency.
Expressing goals in terms of power and vulnerability
provide a high-fidelity means of evaluating the shortterm consequences of actions.
• Most of the other Hermann traits govern personal
and cultural norms and thus appear on the Standards
tree.
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•
The UN GLOBE model of leaders (House, 2004)
includes several traits like Hermann’s but also adds
Scope of Doing and Sensitivity to Life
(humanitarianism) which we adopt here as well. We
also add one further trait, namely Protocol vs.
Substance Focus as a continuum to describe the
leader’s penchant for protocols (e.g., state visits or
speech acts such as religious blessings) as opposed to
taking any concrete actions.
• Resource management doctrine – We add specific
standards that capture the doctrine a leader adheres to
when considering his Economic and Security tanks.
Beneath each subnode that has a + sign, there are
further subnodes, but under the G- and P-trees these are
just each faction’s resources in each territory with
valence and importance valuated weights.
The structure of the GSP trees is shared by all agents.
However, the tree weights are unique for each agent
and thus capture individual differences that may be
determined by culture, ideology, or personality. Other
papers discuss how the weights may be derived so as to
increase credibility: e.g., see Bharathy (2006),
Silverman (2002a,b, 2006b). An example of the
weights is the insurgent leader shown in Figure 2. He is
low on conformity, humanitarianism, scope of doing
good, and treating outgroups with fairness, and high on
exercise of power, and asymmetric warfare.
GSP trees are used by the agent for all decisions – e.g.,
selecting a next game action, determining faction
alliance moves, or deciding on a speech act. They give
each agent a robust and individual worldview. When
contemplating a decision, the agent calculates the
subjective expected utility (SEU) it expects to derive
from every action available to it, as constrained by
perception and chooses the alternative that maximizes
SEU. Thus
Best Response (SEU) =Max{Σ U(ak)*Pr(ak)* Φ(rj)+ ψ}

where utilities (U) for next actions, ak, are the
anticipated E|S|P tank gains or losses the actions afford
combined with how those affect the nodes of a given
agent’s GSP trees. Φ(rj) is a function that captures the
strength of positive and negative relationships one has
with agent or object j that are effected or spared by ak,
and ψ handles merging and discounting (decay) prior
GSP activations. Probabilities assess the likelihood of
success or failure. Also, the GSP tree weights adhere to
principles of probability; e.g., all child node insights
add to unity beneath a given parent, activations and
weights are multiplied up a branch, and no child has
multiple parents (independence). Although we use
fixed weights on the GSP trees, the succeed and fail
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reservoirs on each node (see Fig.2) serve to render
them dynamic and adaptive to the agent's current
needs. Thus, when a given success reservoir is filled,
until ψ decays it, that tends to nullify the importance of
the weight on that node (or amplify it if the failure
reservoir is filled). In this fashion, one can think of a
form of spreading activation (and deactivation) across
the GSP structure as a game proceeds.
Profiling Followers
We introduce three refinements in order to also be able
to model the values and motivations of followers – (1)
additions to the GSP trees, (2) a group-affinity
profiling instrument, and (3) group transfer dynamics
(exit, voice, and loyalty). In keeping with analytic
adequacy, each of these refinements is an
implementation of a well-respected model drawn from
the social sciences. In terms of the Goal tree changes,
the leader goals are still there but may be zeroed out if
this is strictly a follower, or may be left in at some
degree of importance if this is a mid-level leader. For
followers in general, where day-to-day existence is a
struggle, the first four of Maslow (1987)’s hierarchy of
needs is considered a useful representation of the range
of short term goals that a person might have to be
concerned about. Without regard to order of
achievement, these are added to the G-tree under the
node labeled ‘individual’ (see Figure 2). Each of these
nodes are activated by lower level branches on the tree
pertaining to physiology, to relationship dynamics, or
to the affinity instrument described below. In terms of
the Standards Tree, we add Conformity Assertiveness
as a way to capture Hofstede(2003)’s Power-Distance
and Individualism factors (respect authority, conform
to society) and the GLOBE study’s Assertiveness
factor.
For determining an individual’s group affinity, one
needs an instrument that measures it. The instrument
that we have adopted here involves Eidelson and
Eidelson (2003) who have developed a five belief
(“dangerous
ideas”)
framework
for
better
understanding the psychology of individual-group
dynamics particularly relevant to conflict settings.
These beliefs are considered particularly important
influences on a group member’s perceptions of his/her
group’s current circumstances and future prospects.
Eidelson worked with us to help us implement his
model within the GSP tree framework. Thus an agent
who is profiled within the GSP trees can be seen to be
harboring “Dangerous Ideas” to the extent that the five
beliefs are present as follows:
•Vulnerability (V) Revolves around a sense of living
in harm’s way amid constant threat and peril.
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Computed as the inabilitiy of agent i to make progress
toward its objectives (i.e., G- and P-tree successes
minus failures).
•Injustice (I).
Perception of being a victim of
mistreatment by specific others or by the world at
large. Computed as the amount of agent i’s G-tree
failures attributable to others who violate agent i’s Stree, minus G-tree successes that others cause.
•Distrust (D). The presumed hostility and malicious
intent of other individuals or other groups, computed as
the amount to which agent i’s S-tree is violated by
others.
•Superiority (S). Conviction of being better than
others—morally superior, chosen, entitled. Computed
as agent i’s perception of disutility or consequences to
other agents and groups it dislikes of agent i's G-tree
achievements.
•Helplessness (H). Refers to perceived inability to
influence or control events and outcomes; selfperpetuating because it diminishes motivation.
Computed as the world’s disutility: ie, sum of all GSP
tree failures.
With this framework, depending on the perceiver, two
agents may view the same group as superior or inferior,
as suffering grave injustices or as exaggerating minor
slights, as helpless or capable of effective action, and
so on. The agents compute the possibilities. Thus if a
viewer sees a group as vulnerable and he doesn’t want
to be vulnerable, there will be negative activations for
remaining loyal to this group and following its action
choice policies. Conversely less negative (and possibly
positive) activations will be afforded for the member
who exits away from this group perceived as
vulnerable.
Mathematically, the reader may recall Φ(rij) from the
prior section. Here we examine the case where j is a
group (or leader) A and the term refers to the
membership, relationship, or strength of affinity of
agent i to group A. An agent i can belong to multiple
groups at varying strength according to:
Φ(riA) = (SuperiorityA x GSPcongruenceiA) / VIDAi
where, Superiority and VID (=V+I+D) are from
Eidelson instruments if available, else derived by GSP
trees of agent i in reacting to leader or group A.
Groups are characterized by GSP weights for the
average of all members as well as by property lists
defined a priori (religion, political system, corruption,
maturity, etc.), and salience factors. GSP congruence is
estimated using the sum of the means square
differences in the GSP nodes. GSPcongruence = 1 –
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Sqrt[Sum[(wi1 –wi2)^2], which is the correlation of
the weights between two GSP trees. If an agent is in
Group B, it will not be drawn to a Group C whose GSP
archetype is substantially incongruent to its own. If an
agent is in a group (or under control of a leader) whose
average GSP is greatly different from its own, the
agents tend to reduce membership (P-tank
contributions) and use Voice to resist the leader or
attempt to Exit to another group.
If agent i desires to exit from any group A to join any
C, this is governed by the delta in utility of
membership in each group plus a cost factor adjusted
for transfer rate or demand elasticity. If the delta is
positive, or larger than some loyalty factor, exit may
occur. Let, this delta be:
ΔΦj = [ (U(ΦC) +COSTTR ) / TRAC ] - U(ΦA)
where,
U(Φ)
= utility of membership, found from GSP
trees
COSTTR = cost of migration, land costs, and lost
opportunity costs
TRAC =Transfer Rate or group porosity, a measure
of ease of entry to or exit from group A to group C,
TRA→C = SalienceExitA × SalienceEnterC × GSPcongruenceiC
TR varies between (0,-1) and grows larger as porosity
grows. Salience is the extent to which a group permits
exiting by ingroup members, and entry by outgroup
members. It is the porosity permitted by the group.
There is a tuple or value pair that gives both
salienceForEntry and salienceForExit. The demand
elasticity for exiting a group is 1/TR.
The followers compute their grievance state for each
faction, ranging from –4 to +4 an use this to determine
their actions. As an example, suppose an agent
identifies himself with Faction B, but lives under the
rule of Faction A. The top state (GS+4) is total support
of a given Group, say A. A faction getting a mid-point
grievance scale (GS-0) means that agent is undecided
and/or helpless to resist what A wants. At the other
extreme of GS-4, the Faction B agent who lives under
Faction or Leader A has already joined a resistance
faction C working against A. At the extremes on either
end, the agent will submit to militaristic commands of
the leader of that group, while at the next lower level it
will be only willing to go to protests, and verbally and
economically support the activities of that group’s
leaders. Of course, exit from A and joining of C is
governed by TR, and a several tick waiting interval to
be sure the agent doesn’t change its stance.
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EXPERIMENTS
The previous sections synthesized social science
theories pertinent to faction conflict and implemented
them as agent models. Here we present two real world
conflicts. Each begins with various validity tests to see
if the agents correspond to the real world and if the
underlying mechanisms seem adequately represented.
A key policy parameter is then systematically varied in
each experiment to learn the elasticity of conflict to
that course of action.
Elasticity of Conflict in Iraq Due to Outside
Support
During the spring 2006, five student teams assembled a
total of 21 PMFserv leader profiles across 7 real world
factions so that each faction had a leader and two subfaction leaders. The seven factions – government (2
versions - CentralGov and LoclGov), Shia (2 tribes),
Sunnis, Kurds, and Insurgents – could be deployed in
different combinations for different scenarios or
vignettes. The leader and group profiles were
assembled from strictly open source material and
followed a rigorous methodology for collecting
evidence, weighing evidence, considering competing
and incomplete evidence, tuning the GSP trees, and
testing against sample datasets [see for example
Bharathy (2006)]. A well-known fundamentalist Shia
leader’s GSP tree was shown in earlier Figure 2.
Validation testing of these models was run at one of the
military commands for 2 weeks in May 2006. They
assembled 15 SMEs across areas of military,
diplomatic, intel, and systems expertise. Within each
vignette the SMEs attempted dozens of courses of
action across the spectrum of possibilities (rewards,
threats, etc.). One interesting COA is reflected in
earlier Figure 1 by the vertical arrow on the left of the
chart linking the player to the Personality Editor. That
is, a popular COA of the diplomats was to ‘sit down’
with some of the persuadable leaders and have a strong
talk with them. This was simulated by the senior
diplomat adjusting that leader’s personality weights
(e.g., scope of doing good, treatment of outgroups, etc.)
to be what he thought might occur after a call from
President Bush or some other influential leader. The
SME team playing the MNC presented their opinions
at the end of each vignette. The feedback indicated that
the leader and factional models corresponded with
SME knowledge of their real-life counterparts. They
accepted the profiling approach as best in class and
invited us onto the team for the follow on.
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Here we show an illustrative policy experiment on 4
factions initially organized into two weak alliances
(dyads): (i) CentralGov trying to be secular and
democratic with a Shia tribe squarely in their alliance
but also trying to embrace all tribes, (ii) a Shia tribe
that initially starts in the CentralGov’s dyad but has
fundamentalist tendencies, (iii) a secular Sunni tribe
that mildly resents CentralGov but does not include
revengists, and (iv) Insurgents with an Arab leader
trying to attract Sunnis and block Shia control. Each
faction has a leader with two rival sub-leaders (loyal
and fringe) and followers as in Figure 1 – all 12 are
named individuals, many are known in the US. This is
a setup that should mimic some of the factional
behaviors going on in Iraq, although there are dozens
of political factions there in actuality.
Figure 3
summarizes the outcomes of three sample runs (mean
of 100 trials each) over a 2 year window. The vertical
axis indicates the normalized fraction of the sum across
all security tanks in these factions, and thus the strip
chart indicates the portion of the sum that belongs to
each faction. Rises and dips correspond either to
recruiting and/or battle outcomes between groups. The
independent variable is how much outside support is
reaching the two protagonists – CentralGov and
Insurgents. When CentralGov and Insurgents are
externally supported (3A), CentralGov aids the Shia
militia economically while the Shia battle the
Insurgents. Fighting continues throughout the 2 year
run. A take-away lesson of this run seems to be that
democracy needs major and continuous outside help, as
well as luck in battle outcomes and some goodwill
from tribes for it to take root. When only the Insurgents
are supported (3B), the CentralGov is crippled by
Insurgent attacks and civil war prevails. When the
borders are fully closed and no group receives outside
support (3C), the insurgency ultimately fails, but the
CentralGov becomes entirely reliant upon the Shia
group for military strength- a puppet government.
These runs suggest the elasticity of conflict with
respect to outside support is positive, and with no
interference, the country seems able to right itself,
although we in the West might not like the outcome. Of
course these runs only include 4 of the many factions
one could set up and run, plus due to page limits, we
only displayed the effects of actions upon the Security
Tank, and not other resources of the factions.
Earlier we asserted the ΔK and emV terms of payoff
are vital to game theoretic formulations. A human
behavior model such as PMFserv is able to help the
analyst to generate and understand these, though we
omit the strip charts of changing ΔK and emV strengths
due to page limits. As contrasted with normative
agents, factions in our runs fight almost constantly and
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are more likely to attack groups with which they have
negative relationships and strong emotions.
Relationship and emotions also factor into the
formation of alliances. For example, across all runs,
CentralGov has a friendly relationship towards the
Shia, who are moderately positive back. This leads to
CentralGov giving aid to the Shia and consistently
forming an ally. Likewise the Sunni Secular have
slight positive feelings towards the Insurgents, and are
more likely to assist them, unless others are more
powerful. Finally, some action choices seem to have
purely emotional payoffs. For example, from an
economic perspective, the payoff from attacking an
enemy with zero economy is zero - a wasted turn. Yet
in run 2c, when the Insurgents fail, the Shia still
occasionally attack them simply because the Insurgents
are their enemy. This seems to be a case where
emotional are at least as important as material payoffs.

Impact of Leader Action on Follower Choices:
FactionSim for SE Asia
While the previous section focused on leader profiles,
this Section adds the profiles of followers and the
decisions that result. Without naming the actual
country or leader, it has a Buddhist majority and
government. During the 1990s, the country was
relatively stable, however, in the last few years, the
rural provinces have seen a rise of Muslim separatist
sentiment. The Buddhist Leader branded the separatists
as bandits, and sent police from the north to handle
protesters in the Muslim provinces. We obtained a
database of the events with civilian injury and death
and classified the incidents based on the size and
intensity of the incident. The incidents were aggregated
and plotted against time. The data was then
longitudinally separated into ‘independent sets’ with a
training set consisting of Jan-June 2004 while the test
set began July 2004 and ran till Dec 2004 ending just
before the tsunami.
Table 1 - Muslim Faction Shifting from Relatively
Cooperative (GS0-2) to Largely Fighting (GS3 &
GS4)
(2 years, average of 30 repeat trials)
Starting State (Avg of Weeks 1 & 2) End
State
Muslim Population at Start Is Neutral (Avg. Weeks
with Few Grievances Registering
103 & 104)

Figure 3 – Military Power of Iraqi Factions Under
Alternate DIME actions (mean of 100 runs).
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GrievanceState0 - Neutral

30

6%

GrievanceState1 - Disagree

55

1%

GrievanceState2 - Join Oppost

37%

GrievanceState3 - Nonviolent

15
0

39%

GrievanceState4 - Fight-Rebel

0

17%

TOTAL

100

100%

The training dataset was used to profile and tune the
following types of agents for PMFserv (Eidelson was
contracted to profile the Muslims in his instrument):
• Buddhist Group-Leader (structure of his GSP trees
are in Fig 2) - data indicates harsh, cruel, task, corrupt,
wealthy, successful. Sends worst behaving cops down
to provinces, never discourages brutality.
• Muslim Group – Rural villagers lead by a local
sultan agent and sorted into two archetypical
groupings:
• Loyal Muslims - Despite lack of cultural freedom,
muslim schools, etc. they are law-abiding, rural family
members who want some autonomy.
• Fringe Muslims – tend to be sons of Moderates
who were Wahhabi and college-trained, now
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unemployed, running religious schools in family
homes.
• Separatist Group – not profiled, just a placeholder, initially with no members. Scripted to
periodically attack Buddhists.
In PMfserv, we profiled the Buddhist leader, and 161
Muslim agents including 1 Sultan, 80 loyals, and 80
fringe agents. We interoperated these with a cellular
automata that is known as the Civil Violence (CV)
model (Epstein et al., 2001). CV involves two
categories of actors, namely 1,200 villagers and a
variable number of cops. Muslim villagers and may be
actively rebellious or not, depending on their
grievances. ‘Cops’ are the security tank forces of the
Buddhist Leader, who seek out and arrest actively
rebellious agents. The main purpose of introducing CV
is to provide a social network for the cognitively
detailed PMFserv villagers to interact with. The
Buddhist Leader examines the state of the world and
makes action decisions to assist or suppress villagers
(e.g., pay for Buddhist schools, add more cops, reduce
cop brutality, etc.). The 161 PMFserv agents then
assess their view of the world, react to how cops handle
protester events, how their GSPs are being satisfied or
not by leader actions, and to their emotional construals.
The grievance level, leader legitimacy, and group
membership decisions by 160 archetypical villagers in
PMFServ are passed to 160 agents they control in the
cellular automata. These agents influence neighbors in
the population who spread news and form their own
view of the situation. The number of Civil Violence
villagers in each level of grievance (neutral through
Fight Back as shown in the rows of Table 1) are added
up and this information is passed back to PMFserv to
help determine its starting level of grievance for the
next cycle of reactions to Buddhist Leader’s actions.
The left side of Table 1 shows the starting values as
percent of Muslim agents that occupy each Grievance
State. By the end of the run, the right side of Table 1
shows the emergence of a majority of the population
resisting and fighting (non-violent as well as violent).
Specifically, it shows what percent of the population
has been shifted from Neutral Grievance to higher
states (recall the scale of earlier Section 3): GS0
(neutral) through GS4 (fight back).
We compare this simulated grievance over time to a
proxy consisting of the incident severity – a weighted
average of actual fatalities and injuries, where injuries
are simply counted (w=1), but the weight on fatalities
is 100. This was computed from the test dataset
mentioned earlier (not the training data). To conduct
the comparison, we applied the non-parametric
Kendall's Tau measure of correlation. With a two sided
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test, considering the possibility of concordance or
discordance (akin to positive or negative correlation),
we can conclude that there is a statistically significant
lack of dependence between base case simulated
grievance and observed incident severity rankings at a
confidence interval of 88%. In sum, the null hypothesis
is rejected and real (test interval) incident data and
simulation results are correlated.
As to the leadership, in the test dataset, the real
Buddhist leader made 52 decisions affecting the
population. We sorted these into positive, neutral, and
negative actions. In the simulated world, the PMFserv
clone made 56 action decisions in this same interval.
At this level of classification (positive, neutral,
negative), the mutual entropy (M) statistic between the
real and simulated agents was less than 0.05, indicating
significant correlation between real and simulated
agent choices. This high degree of correlation exists
only for the aggregate summary of positive, neutral,
negative actions. If we try to correlate the precise
negative action chosen or when it occurs, the
correlations deteriorate rapidly.
An interesting experiment is to see how this outcome is
affected by altering the Buddhist leader’s policies. To
do so, we can alter his personality (e.g., outgroup are
targets, sensitivity to life, scope of doing good, etc.) by
15% in either direction. Reducing these is equivalent to
what the SMEs in the Iraqi case study attempted when
they had Bush call and try to convince a given leader to
be more tolerant. Raising these up by 15% is what
might happen if he grew more autocratic. Since the
Leader’s attributes lead directly to shifts in his course
of action selections, these three versions of the leader
were run to set up a range of potential futures for the
followers. Thus, the y-axis of Figure 4 shows
increasing losses of civil rights or the Inverse Quality
of Citizenship (InvQtyCitizenship) as measured by the
Muslim Group’s calculated grievances (or VID). The
x-axis shows the decision of these agents to retain
membership in the Buddhist-lead Government (these
are the members of GS0, GS1, and GS2). Agents who
leave and join the separatists (GS3 and GS4) are not
appearing in this plot. The plot thus shows that as long
as conditions are not too intolerable, the entire
population cooperates and remains. As conditions
worsen, more and more agents exit and membership
shrinks. This is what Hirshman (1970) refers to as the
demand curve for civil rights. In FactionSim, we are
able to fit the following linear regression to this
demand curve with an R-square of 0.79
InvQltyCitizenship = 1.35- 0.83 Membership_as_ Fraction

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2007

revalidated? We summarize working with one of these
scientists and found him positive about such an agenda,
and confirmed that other scientists would be similarly
open to a synthetic agenda. Despite having worked
reductively to reach their position of prominence, it
seems that synthesis is a path forward that many in the
field are willing to embrace.

Figure 4 – Derived Demand Curve for Civil Rights
by Faction Y’s Followers
The Buddhist leader’s ingroup bias, financial wealth,
narrow scope of helping only his own faction to the
north, and willingness to use violent repression seem to
combine in the real world (and in our model of him)
and make him unable to comprehend this new reality.
In the summer of 2005, he had to impose martial law
on these provinces to try and quell the separatist
movement. In the summer of 2006, with the approval
of the monarch, a military junta removed him from
power due to his mismanagement of this situation and
economic issues.
LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT STEPS
The primary argument against rational game theory is
its poor track record of prediction in matters of real
world conflict primarily because it often simplifies the
game and agents to the point that they bear little
resemblance to the real world. Behavioral Game
Theory seeks to overcome this dilemma, however,
there is a lack of first principles in the social sciences
for modeling agents. The field offers best-of-breed
theories and instruments, but these exist in reductive
silos (specialties) and few of these have computational
implementations. To pass the test of analytic adequacy,
we needed to map a number of social science models
into a common utility-theoretic formalism and integrate
them together into a faction modeling framework –
e.g., Hermann, Hofstede, UN Globe, Eidelson,
Hirshman, and so on. This synthesis was necessary
(and successful) in order to have agent models capable
of playing the roles of real world leaders and followers
in rival factions. Such an integration, however, exposes
the edges of the individual models and identifies an
agenda for synthetic research. Did we include/exclude
the right set of profiling factors? Does our
implementation preserve the original intent? Did we fill
in the gaps properly? Can the merged trait set be
2007 Paper No. 7015 Page 10 of 11

In terms of ontologic adequacy of the current faction
model synthesis, this research has tried to explore its
robustness and cross-sample fitness. It is worth
dwelling a bit on the benefits that were observed and
the lessons learned from the case studies of this paper.
For one thing, the descriptive agents passed validity
assessment tests in both conflict scenarios attempted—
our current day Iraqi leader agents were passed after
extensive subject matter expert evaluation and the SE
Asia leader and followers passed separate
correspondence tests (correlations of over 79% on
average). Validity is a difficult thing to claim, and one
can always devise new tests. A strong test, however, is
the out-of-sample tests that these agents also passed.
Thus the SE Asian leader and followers were trained
on different data than they were tested against. Further,
the complete structure of the model of the leaders was
originally derived in earlier studies of the ancient
Crusades (Silverman et al. 2005) and this was
transferred to the SE Asian and Iraqi domains. The
only thing updated was the values of the weights for
GSP trees and various other group relations and
membership parameters – derived from open sources.
So the structure of the leader model also survived and
passed two out-of-sample tests relative to the Crusades
dataset.
This article concludes with two experiments, one for
assessing the elasticity of conflict in Iraq with respect
to outside support, and the other for determining rate of
radicalization of the population (and its inverse,
demand for civil rights). These experiments explain
what has and is being observed, and hence illustrate the
promise of descriptive agents for extending game
theory. The title of this article may be a bit of an
overstatement, but using profiling as the basis of
descriptive agent models does seem to be the correct
approach for sociological game theory. ‘Correctness’ is
more about the generative mechanisms inside the
agents than whether any given predictions are accurate.
If the generative mechanisms are roughly ‘correct’, one
can have trust that experiments on these agents will
yield useful insights about the alternative policies that
influence them. Both experiments presented here pass
initial adequacy tests and illustrate how analysts might
use agent tools to explore policy alternatives and to
identify parameter sensitivities and robustness. We also
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hope the results illustrate this as a promising research
direction with further research steps warranted.
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